It is a commonly held belief in many secular societies that religion is not only unnecessary but also, in an historical perspective, inextricably linked with violence and hatred on an unparalleled scale. The induced assertion, then, is that religion has been little more than an ornamental obstruction to our species' development.
Neither history nor anthropology knows of any society in which religion has been totally absent, and even those modern states that have attempted to abolish religion have replaced it with beliefs and practices which themselves seem religious (Rappaport 1971). The anthropologist E. B. Tylor, writing in 1871, attempted to account for the universality of human religious beliefs by reference to the psychic unity of humankind. It is the experience of dreaming, posited Tylor, that has suggested to all men the existence of a soul, and it is from this primordial notion that all religion has evolved.
At the turn of last century, Tylor's view was challenged by the great sociologist Emile Durkheim, who asked "How could a vain fantasy have been able to fashion the human consciousness so strongly and so durably?". It cannot be accepted, he argued, that "systems of ideas like religions, which have held so considerable a place in history, and from which, in all times, men have come to receive the energy which they must have to live, should be made up of a tissue of illusions (1961)."
As Rappaport (1971) has noted, it is both plausible and prudent to assume, at least initially, that anything which is universal to human culture is likely to contribute to human survival:
"Phenomena that are merely incidental, or peripheral, or epiphenomenal to the mechanisms of survival are hardly likely to become universal, nor to remain so if they do. When we consider further that religious beliefs and practices have frequently been central to human concerns and when we reflect upon the amount of time, energy, emotion, and treasure that men have expended in building religious monuments, supporting priestly hierarchies, fighting holy wars, and in sacrifices to assure their well-being in the next world, we find it hard to imagine that religion, as bizarre and irrational as it may seem or even be, has not contributed positively to human evolution and adaptation."
Would not an enterprise as expensive as religion have been defeated by selective pressures if it were merely frivolous and illusory? Surely its benefits must outweigh its costs? Rappaport's hypothesis, therefore, is that religion has not merely been important but crucial to human adaptation. If such a contention is valid, as much evidence since amassed has suggested it is, it may prove a further thorn in the side of those secular humanists who so readily and naively engage in the religious hatred they supposedly abhor. The reactionary dismissal of "Religion" based only on consideration of its costs is akin to throwing away one's stove because one occasionally burns one's fingers. So, would humankind somehow have been "better off" without religion? Ask an orangutan.
Further Reading
Tylor, E. B. 1871. Religion in Primitive Culture. London: John Murray.
Durkheim, E. 1961. The Elementary Foms of Religious Life. New York: Collier.
Rappaport, R. A. 1971. The sacred in human evolution. Annual Review of Ecology and Systematics 2: 23-44.